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[A] requirement of procedural regularity at least renders arbitrary action
more difficult. Moreover, proper procedures will surely eliminate some
of the arbitrariness that results, not from malice, but from innocent
error. . . . When the government knows it may have to justify its
decisions with sound reasons, its conduct is likely to be more cautious,
careful, and correct.I
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contributions. As always, any and all errors and omissions are mine alone.




One of the most significant omissions in the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)2 is its failure to prescribe procedures for-or even to address
directly-informal adjudications. To be sure, Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe3 interprets the APA to provide for ex post judicial
review of informal agency adjudications.4  Accordingly, a person
dissatisfied with an agency's behavior may seek review under the APA
after the fact.
An ex post model of accountability, however, leaves much to be desired.
To be sure, the prospect of judicial review might well provide a sufficient
incentive for agencies to behave rationally (even if they do not think
anyone is really looking). On the other hand, the general absence of any
ex ante procedural requirements surely burdens the ability of would-be
plaintiffs to mount challenges to irrational agency action. Moreover,
average citizens may be unaware of the availability ofjudicial review, or be
unable to take advantage of it because of a lack of access to legal
representation.
It is more than a little ironic that the vast bulk of federal agency action
flies under the radar screen of the APA-yet, this is true. As Professor
Edward Rubin noted, "the APA does not actually use the term informal
adjudication at all, and barely acknowledges the concept." 5 He suggests
that "[t]he drafters have so little to say about it because they did not
conceptualize it as an identifiable category of government action.",
6
Nevertheless, over ninety percent of agency actions constitute "informal
adjudications. 7
2. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000)).
3. 401 U.S. 402, 414-15,419-20 (1971).
4. See id.; see also Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton
Park's Requirement ofJudicial Review "On the Record, " 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 198-
211 (1996) (explaining how Overton Park altered judicial review of informal agency actions
by creating a de facto obligation to create a record that would facilitate judicial review).
5. Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 108 (2003).
6. Id.
7. See PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 142 (1989)
("Yet informal adjudications constitute the great bulk of government actions meeting the
statutory definition of 'adjudication,' perhaps as much as 95% of those actions; and as we
shall see, they are fully subject to judicial review."); see also Jeffrey M. Sellers, Note,
Regulatory Values and the Exceptions Process, 93 Yale L.J. 938, 950 n.56 (1984) ("Perhaps
90% of governmental actions that directly affect individuals take the form of informal
adjudication beyond the reach of the APA."); John H. Reese, Regularizing Informal
Adjudication Under the APA 13-14 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
("It is said that perhaps 90% of the federal agency 'adjudications,' as defined by the APA,
are informal. Lacking significant procedural requirements in the APA, the actual
procedures followed by the agencies making informal adjudications must vary widely.").
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Of course, the APA contains a few provisions applicable to informal
adjudications, even though they are not specifically directed toward such
proceedings. For example, the Supreme Court has held that § 555 of the
APA provides the APA's procedural blueprint for informal adjudications.8
This would come as something of a surprise to the APA's Framers---they
intentionally omitted informal adjudications from the scope of the statute.
As the Attorney General's Manual on the APA explains:
It has been pointed out that "limiting application of the sections [on
adjudication] to those cases in which statutes require a hearing is
particularly significant, because thereby are excluded the great mass of
administrative routine as well as pensions, claims, and a variety of
similar matters in which Congress has usually intentionally or
traditionally refrained from requiring an administrative hearing."
9
Section 555, entitled "Ancillary Matters," does not seem to be addressed
to informal adjudications per se. Moreover, the Attorney General's Manual
confirms this understanding: "[Section 555] defines various procedural
rights of private parties which may be incidental to rule making,
adjudication, or the exercise of any other agency authority."10  Thus, it
would be accurate to say that § 555 applies to informal adjudications
(unless Congress expressly exempts a particular proceeding or the
proceeding falls within a matter otherwise exempt from the APA's
provisions), but it would be something of an overstatement to suggest that
the APA itself addresses, in a direct fashion, the procedural requirements
associated with informal adjudications.1 '
Thus, the APA does not provide any specific and dedicated procedural
requirements applicable to informal adjudications, and Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Vermont
Yankee) 12 effectively precludes reviewing courts from imposing procedures
8. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. The LTV Corp., Inc., 496 U.S. 633, 655 (1990)
("The determination in this case, however, was lawfully made by informal adjudication, the
minimal requirements for which are set forth in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 555, and do not include
such elements.").
9. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 41 (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL]
(quoting Senate Comparative Print of June 1945, at 7); see also Note, The Federal
Administrative Procedure Act: Codification or Reform?, 56 Yale L.J. 670, 705 (1947)
(presenting grid with a blank for APA procedural requirements applicable to "informal
adjudications").
10. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 9, at 61.
11. See Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review In Administrative Law, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1216-17 (1992) ("The APA provides only rudimentary procedures for
rulemaking and none at all for informal adjudication; for neither function does it define a
record for judicial review.").
12. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 524, 543 (1978) (holding that federal courts, when reviewing an agency's action, may
not impose procedural requirements beyond those mandated by the organic act at issue, the
APA, or, when applicable, procedural due process, and must instead review the substance of
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on federal administrative agencies. Nevertheless, such decisions are
subject to judicial review under the APA. Plaintiffs may seek post-decision
review of informal agency adjudications under the rubric of the APA
itself.' 3  In addition, plaintiffs may bring challenges to adverse agency
actions in informal adjudications under the rubric of either an organic
statute or a constitutional claim. Procedural due process, substantive due
process, and equal protection all provide an after-the-fact means of
challenging an arbitrary agency action in the context of an informal
adjudication.
After-the-fact, ex post opportunities for review undoubtedly encourage
agencies voluntarily to adopt procedures that will enable them to defend
their actions. Thus, the availability of ex post remedies creates a feedback
loop that could affect the quality of the ex ante process. But, with the
possible exception of procedural due process claims, this feedback loop is
an imperfect mechanism for ensuring fair process in the first instance.
Accordingly, and as explained in greater detail below, this Article's
proposal for amending the APA would be to adopt a new subsection within
§ 554 that addresses informal agency adjudications directly, and sets forth
minimal procedural safeguards in the context of those adjudications.
I. Ex POST CONSTRAINTS ON AGENCY INFORMAL ADJUDICATIONS
After an agency has made a final decision, several means of seeking
judicial review exist. An unhappy claimant may seek judicial review under
the APA; alternatively, the claimant could bring constitutional claims
(whether as a strategic decision or because, in the particular case, APA
review is not available). Both statutory and constitutional means of
seeking after-the-fact review of informal adjudications are discussed below.
A. The APA
The APA itself, as interpreted in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe (Overton Park),14 provides a means of securing after-the-fact
judicial review of most agency informal adjudications. 15 A would-be
plaintiff may invoke § 706(2)(A)'s "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review to obtain general review of an agency's decision in an informal
the agency's decision to determine whether the ultimate decision is itself arbitrary and
capricious).
13. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15, 419-20
(1971) (holding that virtually all agency decisions may be reviewed under the APA and
requiring reviewing courts to examine decisions carefully and thoughtfully, even though the
applicable standard of review requires deference to reasonable agency decisions).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 414-20 (setting forth requirements for APA review of an agency's
informal adjudication, including definition of the "record" in such proceedings).
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adjudication.' 6  A reviewing court will apply "hard look" review and
require an agency to justify its decision on the basis of the record as it
existed at the time the agency acted. 7
APA review provides a powerful tool for enforcing agency
accountability ex post, but it does very little to encourage agency
accountability ex ante. Vermont Yankee's proscription against reviewing
courts imposing procedures on agencies means that an agency is free to use
whatever procedures (or non-procedures) it desires, so long as the end
result is demonstrably rational.18 As Professor Young observed, "[e]xcept
for some small set of truly exceptional cases, Vermont Yankee ended the
lower federal courts' practice of occasionally requiring agencies to conduct
their informal proceedings with more safeguards than the minimum
required by the Constitution, the APA, or more specific statutes."'
' 9
Viewed ex ante, § 706(2)(A) review 20 imposes only indirect constraints
on the actual process of agency decisionmaking; an interested person
cannot demand either advance notice or an opportunity to participate in the
decisional process at the front end of the proceedings (absent some other
claim of right arising under an organic act or the Constitution itself).
Accordingly, persons who wish to participate in the process of agency
decisionmaking must look elsewhere for relief.
B. Constitutional Claims As A Substitute for APA Review
Would-be plaintiffs have attempted to challenge adverse agency
decisions in the context of informal adjudications using procedural due
process, substantive due process, and equal protection theories. Each of
these potential avenues of review is discussed below, with attention to the
potential advantages and disadvantages of each.
1. Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process requires, at a minimum, notice, a hearing with
some sort of opportunity to be heard, and the communication of a
decision. 2  Depending on the particular circumstances, procedural due
16. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
17. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973) (holding that the record for judicial
review of an agency action is the actual record that was before the agency at the time of its
decision, rather than the new record created incident to judicial review proceedings, and
emphasizing that the ultimate validity of an agency's "action must, therefore, stand or fall
on the propriety of that [decision], judged, of course, by the appropriate standard of
review").
18. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
524, 543 (1978) (prohibiting generally a reviewing court from imposing non-statutory
procedural requirements on a federal administrative agency).
19. Young, supra note 4, at 206 n.96.
20. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
21. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970) (holding that, consistent with
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process might well require additional procedural bells and whistles. 22
The problem with using procedural due process to challenge an adverse
agency decision in the context of an informal adjudication is that one must
establish the existence of a liberty or property interest as a prerequisite to
claiming a right to procedural due process (the Roth/Perry requirement).23
Although some legal scholars have suggested that the federal courts should
frame procedural due process broadly, as a kind of guarantee against
"procedural grossness, 24 the Supreme Court has steadfastly adhered to the
liberty/property requirement as a prerequisite to an obligation on the
government's part to provide any process.25
In an informal adjudication, if the would-be plaintiff can establish a legal
right to a particular agency action, she can establish a property interest and,
correspondingly, a right to the protection of procedural due process.
Whether an application for benefits gives rise to a "legitimate claim of
entitlement," however, remains an open question.26 To the extent that the
grant or denial of a government action represents truly discretionary
government action, however, a would-be plaintiff is probably out of luck.
The primary benefit of using procedural due process to challenge an
agency's informal adjudication is that, if successful, the claim would
the requirements of procedural due process, the government must provide public assistance
recipients with minimum process, including notice, an oral hearing, an unbiased
decisionmaker, and a formal decision based on the record, before terminating public
assistance benefits).
22. See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975)
(cataloguing and discussing various procedural requirements that a reviewing court might
deem procedural due process to require, and engaging in a cost/benefit analysis of each
procedure); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976) (discussing the
various factors and considerations relevant to ascertaining the minimum process that the 5th
and 14th Amendments require before the government implements a decision burdening a
liberty or property interest).
23. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1972) (establishing the
requirement of a cognizable liberty or property interest as a prerequisite to any meritorious
claim to procedural due process rights); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596-98
(1972) (holding that a liberty or property interest must be established).
24. See William W. Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due
Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 450-51, 487-90 (1977)
(arguing that the Due Process Clauses should protect citizens against "procedural grossness"
generally, regardless of whether a plaintiff can establish the existence of a discrete liberty or
property interest).
25. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 43-44, 61 n.13 (1999)
(noting that "[r]espondents do not contend that they have a property interest in their claims
for payment, as distinct from the payments themselves," and declining to reach the merits of
this question).
26. See Virginia T. Vance, Note, Applications for Benefits: Due Process, Equal
Protection, and the Right to Be Free From Arbitrary Procedures, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
883, 884-88, 925-27 (2004) (noting the Supreme Court's failure to address whether an
application for benefits gives rise to a cognizable property or liberty interest; considering
various theories under which one could argue in favor of judicial recognition of a
constitutional right to non-arbitrary consideration of an application for benefits; and noting
that, under present law, a truly discretionary government decision probably does not trigger
procedural due process protection).
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require the agency to open its decisional process to the plaintiff. In other
words, a successful procedural due process claimant has a right to
participate in the agency's decisional process. This could be crucial:
because Overton Park ultimately applies a very deferential standard of
review, the ability to help build the record could be essential in establishing
that an agency's decision is irrational.27
2. Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clauses require the government to use fair procedures
when burdening a "liberty" or "property" interest. The Due Process
Clauses also prohibit fundamentally unfair or unjust government action.28
A person wishing to challenge an adverse government decision affecting a
liberty or property interest might bring a substantive due process claim.
On various occasions, the Supreme Court has held that government
action that is utterly arbitrary, to the point of "shocking the conscience,"
gives rise to a substantive due process violation.29 In the administrative
law context, the Supreme Court has held that an agency must create and
27. Moreover, the average citizen's practical ability to pursue judicial review of an
adverse agency decision is probably quite limited-access to legal representation for
litigating such claims requires financial commitments beyond the means of most average
Americans, and few citizens probably even realize that recourse to the federal courts exists
when an agency denies benefits or rejects a grant application. See generally MOLLY IVANS
& Lou DUBOSE, SHRUB: THE SHORT BUT HAPPY POLITICAL LIFE OF GEORGE W. BUSH 94-95
(2000) (reporting that most parents of children who are ineligible for the Texas Children's
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) because "their families earn too little to qualify for
CHIP" nevertheless "automatically qualify for Medicaid," but fail to file the necessary
application form to receive the Medicaid benefits for themselves or their children); id. at 95
("In other words, if CHIP applicants qualified for Medicaid, they would have to make an
appointment at a Medicaid office and fill out another application. And that application is
difficult and complicated. . . 'All the studies show that 66 percent never return."').
28. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555
(1997) (distinguishing procedural and substantive due process, and arguing for substantive
due process protection against irrational or arbitrary government action); see also Peter J.
Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process,
and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 833 (2003) (arguing for judicial recognition of
substantive due process protection for both liberty and property interests, whether or not
they are "fundamental" in nature).
29. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-47 (1998) (noting that
"[s]ince the time of our early explanations of due process, we have understood the core of
the concept to be protection against arbitrary [government] action," and describing the
standard for showing a violation by Executive Branch personnel as behavior that "shocks
the conscience" or that "violates the 'decencies of civilized conduct'); see also E.
Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 548-49 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing and
applying the substantive due process requirement of fundamentally fair, non-arbitrary
government action, and finding this norm breached where the federal government imposed
severely retroactive funding obligations on former employers of now-retired coal miners to
fund health care benefits for the retired coal miners and their dependents); BMW v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 574-75, 585-86 (1996) (holding that the substantive due process norm against
arbitrary or fundamentally unjust government action limits the size of punitive damage




then observe its own rules and regulations when evaluating a claim.3 °
Accordingly, a would-be plaintiff wishing to challenge an adverse
government decision might attempt to cast her claim as sounding in
substantive due process.
There are two possible difficulties with attempting to obtain judicial
review of informal adjudication via this route. First, some circuits have
read the Roth/Perry liberty/property threshold requirement into substantive
due process case law. In these circuits, recasting a claim as "substantive"
rather than "procedural" will not avoid the obligation to satisfy the
Roth/Perry "legitimate claim of entitlement" requirement.3' In the absence
of such a "legitimate claim of entitlement," these circuits refuse to
recognize any substantive due process claim.
Other circuits have imposed a requirement that the interest at issue be
"fundamental" for substantive due process to apply. The Eleventh Circuit
takes this approach.32 Needless to say, this requirement significantly limits
the potential universe of substantive due process claims. It is unlikely that
30. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232-35 (1974) (requiring agencies to adopt and
follow rules that govern the exercise of delegated discretion; explaining that "[w]here the
rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent on agencies to follow their own
procedures," and emphasizing that "[n]o matter how rational or consistent with
congressional intent a particular decision might be, the determination of eligibility [for a
government program] cannot be made on an ad hoc basis by the dispenser of the funds");
see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2000) (holding that "absence of specific
standards" to ensure equal application of a rule violates the equal protection clause in the
context of a state-wide recount of the 2000 presidential election ballots in Florida); Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law: Bush v.
Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudence of Oprah!, 90 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2121-22 (2002)
("Black letter administrative law principles prohibit agencies from arbitrarily administering
their duties.").
31.. See, e.g., Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2000) (requiring
the plaintiff to show a legitimate claim of entitlement to a liberty or property interest before
proceeding to consider the merits of a substantive due process claim); Zahra v. Town of
Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 680 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that "a party must first establish that he
had a valid 'property interest' in a benefit that was entitled to constitutional protection");
RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Vill. of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 915 (2d Cir. 1989)
(discussing the clear entitlement aspects of claims). Not all circuits require parties to
establish a claim of entitlement to the government approval being sought. For example, the
Third Circuit has permitted a substantive due process challenge to an adverse zoning
decision on the theory that an adverse decision affecting a fee simple absolute interest is
sufficient to trigger the property protections of the Due Process Clauses. See DeBlasio v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 600-01 (3d Cir. 1995) (permitting a substantive due
process challenge to an adverse zoning decision on the theory that an adverse decision
affecting a fee simple absolute interest is sufficient to trigger the property protections of the
Due Process Clauses); see also LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Hous. Auth., 55 F.3d 1097,
1110-11 (6th Cir. 1995) (following a similar approach).
32. See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1558-60 (1lth Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (requiring a would-be plaintiff with a substantive due process
claim to establish the existence of a "fundamental" interest as an essential element of the
substantive due process claim, holding that substantive due process provides no protection
to non-fundamental liberty and property interests, and concluding that "because
employment rights are not 'fundamental' rights created by the Constitution, they do not
enjoy substantive due process protection").
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most government benefit programs will create an interest on an applicant's
part that rises to this level of importance.
33
Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation (Buckeye)
34
addressed the question of substantive due process challenges to
discretionary government action (in the specific context of land use
regulation) in very general terms. Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor avoided deciding whether the Roth/Perry requirement of a
legitimate claim of entitlement to a land use permit constitutes an essential
element of a substantive due process claim, stating: "We need not decide
whether respondents possessed a property interest in the building permits,
because the city engineer's refusal to issue the permits while the petition
[for a referendum] was pending in no sense constituted egregious or
arbitrary government conduct., 35  The Court found that a city charter
provision permitting citizens to seek a referendum on proposed land use
permits did not violate the Due Process Clause: "The subjection of the site-
plan ordinance to the City's referendum process, regardless of whether that
ordinance reflected an administrative or legislative decision, did not
constitute per se arbitrary government conduct in violation of due
process. 36
Buckeye seems to establish that substantive due process may be used to
challenge adverse government adjudicative decisions. Whether a plaintiff
must establish a legitimate claim of entitlement to a particular permit or
approval remains to be decided. We do know, however, that such a claim
must assert utterly arbitrary or irrational government action.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the Buckeye
decision, but wrote separately to disavow the very existence of substantive
due process claims seeking to vindicate non-fundamental rights: "It would
be absurd to think that all 'arbitrary and capricious' government action
violates substantive due process--even, for example, the arbitrary and
capricious cancellation of a public employee's parking privileges.
37
Justice Scalia argued that substantive due process protects "certain
'fundamental liberty interests' from deprivation by the government, unless
the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.,
38
33. By way of contrast, however, a would-be plaintiff with an equal protection claim
would not have to meet any of these preliminary requirements--indeed, the only unique
element in an equal protection case (beyond a showing of irrational or arbitrary government
action) is a showing of ill will or animus (and only in those circuits that have adopted this
interpretation). See Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998); see
also infra notes 42 to 52 and accompanying text.
34. 538 U.S. 188 (2003).
35. Id. at 198.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 200 (Scalia, J., concurring).
38. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
2004] 1065
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W RE VIEW
A plaintiff's interest in a building permit or a parking space "is not among
these 'fundamental liberty interests,"' and therefore merits no substantive
due process protection.39
So, what, if any, provision of the Constitution protects a citizen from
arbitrary and irrational government action affecting property interests?
Justice Scalia notes that the Takings Clause provides a remedy for the loss
of a private property interest, if the government acts to advance a public
purpose. In addition, "[t]hose who claim "arbitrary' deprivations of
nonfundamental liberty interests must look to the.Equal Protection Clause,
and Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989), precludes the use of
'substantive due process' analysis when a more specific constitutional
provision governs. 40
Of course, Justice Scalia was writing only for himself and Justice
Thomas. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority seems to embrace
substantive due process review of adverse government decisions affecting
non-fundamental property interests, but requires a high threshold showing
of arbitrariness in order to prevail. Until the Supreme Court provides better
guidance, substantive due process challenges to arbitrary government
actions adversely affecting non-fundamental interests will remain
something of a doctrinal morass.
Thus, substantive due process provides a means of seeking review in
cases not otherwise reviewable under the APA itself (because of an express
exclusion or because the precise matter at issue is "committed to agency
discretion" under § 701(a)). That said, substantive due process would not
require an agency to open its decisional process up to participation by the
plaintiff, nor would it require an agency to adopt any particular procedural
protections.
3. Equal Protection Doctrine
In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech , the Supreme Court broadly
endorsed the use of the equal protection doctrine to challenge "irrational
and wholly arbitrary" government decisions. The case involved
Willowbrook's refusal to connect Olech's home to the water and sanitary
sewer system unless Olech ceded a thirty-three foot easement to the
Village.42 In all other cases, Willowbrook had required only a fifteen foot
easement. After a three month delay, the Village of Willowbrook relented
and agreed to connect Olech's home, provided that she conveyed the
39. Id.
40. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 200-01
(2003).
41. 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
"intentional and arbitrary discrimination" by local officials).
42. Id. at 563.
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43customary fifteen foot easement to the Village.
Olech sued the Village, alleging a violation of her equal protection
rights. Olech claimed that the demand for the thirty-three foot easement
was "irrational and wholly arbitrary," and "was actually motivated by ill
will resulting from Olech's previous filing of an unrelated, successful
lawsuit against the Village." 4 The district court dismissed Olech's suit,
but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.45  The
viability of Olech's suit turned on whether a plaintiff can bring an equal
protection claim involving a "class of one."
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous per curiam opinion, held that Olech
could maintain a lawsuit alleging an equal protection violation against a
class of one: "Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims
brought by a 'class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there
is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. 46 The Equal Protection
Clause exists "to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express
terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents. 47
In the case at bar, Olech's allegations of "irrational and wholly arbitrary"
treatment, "quite apart from the Village's subjective motivation, are
sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection
analysis." 8 The Court did not "reach the alternative theory of 'subjective
ill will' relied on" by the Seventh Circuit.49
After Olech, a person or entity aggrieved by an adverse government
decision involving differential, negative treatment could proceed directly to
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Olech v. Viii. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
an allegation that the village demanded a greater easement from the homeowner than from
other homeowners, due to ill will resulting from homeowner's previous lawsuit against the
village, stated a claim under the equal protection clause).
46. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
47. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has consistently
held that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause "reverse incorporates" the Equal
Protection Clause-which, on its face, only applies against state and local government
entities-against the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500
(1954) (holding that "it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a
lesser duty [to refrain from the use of race-based classifications] on the Federal
Government," and concluding that "racial segregation in the public schools of the District of
Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution"); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-18, 223-24
(1995) (summarizing the case law to date and noting that "reverse incorporation" of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause into the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause constitutes a well-settled principle of constitutional law).




federal court with an equal protection challenge to the decision. The
plaintiff would have to establish that the adverse government decision was
"wholly arbitrary and irrational." Although the Supreme Court did not
directly require it, the plaintiff would logically have to show that this
shabby treatment was unique, or relatively unique, to her. Equal protection
guarantees equal treatment, not reasonable treatment; the prohibition runs
against unprincipled differential treatment. If government treats everyone
disdainfully, it might violate notions of substantive due process, but such
behavior probably would not transgress the equal protection guarantee.
50
In light of Olech, equal protection represents a clear and quite viable
alternative means of seeking review of adverse agency decisions in the
context of informal adjudications. 51 Moreover, the Roth/Perry threshold
showing of a lack of discretion simply does not apply in this context; equal
protection claims are not contingent on establishing a pre-existing liberty or
property interest. Cases in which a plaintiff can assert some sort of
individualized animus appear to have the best prospects for success, but in
some circuits, proving "wholly arbitrary or irrational" government action
will be sufficient to establish an equal protection claim.
An equal protection claim will not, however, address the problem of
deficiencies in procedure prior to the agency's decision. Like substantive
due process, equal protection claims are essentially fungible with APA
50. A split presently exists in the lower federal courts regarding an additional showing
of animus or subjective ill will. The Seventh and Fifth Circuits, for example, require a
showing of "vindictive action," "illegitimate animus," or "ill will." See Olech, 160 F.3d at
386, 388; see also Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1080 (2001) (adhering to a subjective animus requirement); Shipp v.
McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 916 (5th Cir. 2000) ("To state a claim sufficient for relief, a single
plaintiff must allege that an illegitimate animus or ill will motivated her intentionally
different treatment from others similarly situated and that no rational basis existed for such
treatment."); Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995) ("If the power of
government is brought to bear on a harmless individual merely because a powerful state or
local official harbors a malignant animosity toward him, the individual ought to have a
remedy in federal court."). On the other hand, the Second Circuit does not appear to require
such a showing: "[P]roof of subjective ill will is not an essential element of a 'class of one'
equal protection claim." See Jackson v. Burke, 256 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2001). But see
Harlen Associates v. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 500 (2d Cir. 2001) (acknowledging
that the Second Circuit has not required a showing of subjective ill will or animus, but
noting the existence of a circuit split on this question). Accordingly, a would-be plaintiff
should take care to ascertain the local circuit's approach and to incorporate appropriate
allegations of fact to address the subjective animus requirement if the local circuit requires
it. The Second Circuit's approach better comports with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Olech. Only Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, specifically required a showing of
subjective animus. See Olech, 528 U.S. at 565-66 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasizing the
importance of Olech's allegations of "vindictive action," "illegitimate animus," and "ill
will," and suggesting that such "added factors" might be necessary to avoid "transforming
run-of-the-mill zoning cases into cases of constitutional right"). The majority, by way of
contrast, clearly distanced itself from requiring such a showing as an essential element of a
class of one equal protection claim.
51. See, e.g., Harlen, 273 F.3d at 499-500 (applying Olech and holding that an adverse
land use decision, if irrational, constitutes an equal protection violation).
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claims under § 706(2)(A). This is not to say that such claims are irrelevant.
Both equal protection and substantive due process present opportunities for
review that might not exist under the APA; as such, they are important
arrows in an administrative practitioner's quiver. That said, if a plaintiffs
objective is to obtain a seat at the table prior to the agency rendering a
decision in an informal adjudication, equal protection and substantive due
process do not provide much help.
II. Ex ANTE CONSTRAINTS ON INFORMAL ADJUDICATIONS: AMENDING
§ 554 To PROVIDE MINIMAL PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN SOME
INFORMAL ADJUDICATIONS
The APA's failure to address procedural requirements for informal
adjudications does not represent the end of the matter. The use of the APA
and constitutional claims to seek review of final agency decisions, coupled
with the potential applicability of procedural due process protection in an
important subset of informal adjudications, should ensure that agencies will
adopt fundamentally fair procedures to govern informal adjudications that
materially affect an individual or discrete class of persons. Even so, it
would make sense to provide a unified standard of review for such
proceedings.
Many administrative law scholars have noted the APA's failure to
provide procedural rules for informal adjudications and suggested that the
conflicting goals of fairness and efficiency explain this state of affairs.
Professor Peter Strauss observes that "[p]erhaps the most striking aspect of
the APA's provisions on adjudication is their essential failure to specify
any procedure for informal adjudications. 52  Strauss posits that "[t]his
general failure of procedural specification reflects, in part, the demands of
informality," and "the enormous difficulty the drafters would have faced in
devising and stating general procedural provisions to govern matters that,
in 1946, made no substantial claim for procedural detail. 53
The problem, of course, is the sheer volume of informal adjudications.
Taken to its logical extreme, a decision to turn on the lights or lower an
agency's office building temperature two degrees constitutes "informal
adjudication." An administrative model that subjected every such agency
decision to mandatory procedures and judicial review could be a
prescription for chaos. As Professor Young has noted, "informal
proceedings are a set of proceedings by a wide variety of agencies on
widely differing subjects, but possessing a single characteristic," namely
52. STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 141.
53. Id. at 142. For an excellent general political history of the APA, see George B.
Shepard, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal
Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1557 (1996).
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that "all of these are matters as to which more formal procedures and
exacting judicial review are not cost-justified., 54 He suggests that "[o]n
this view, if agency proceedings are thoughtfully aligned to the formal or
the informal set, then informal proceedings presumably would be either
matters in which little was at stake, or matters in which additional
procedures would yield little extra fairness, or both."55
Even so, many scholars and commentators have suggested that
mandatory procedures to govern at least some informal adjudications
would be desirable. Three papers presented at the symposium meeting
advance this view.56  Professor Marshall Breger, a former head of the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), has noted that
"[t]he drafters of the APA purposely eschewed any attempt to establish
minimum procedural requirements for most 'informal agency action."'
57
"Nevertheless, without formalizing such decision-making, significant
improvement is possible in the process by which these decisions are
made." 58  Moreover, other legal scholars have suggested that the APA
should establish minimum procedural requirements for at least some
informal adjudications.59
The Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association, in a
draft report, describes informal adjudication as "the black hole of
administrative law" and proposes a "barebones system of notice,
participation, and statement of reasons to assure a civilized interchange
between government officials and private parties when it is practicable to
54. Young, supra note 4, at 199-200.
55. Id. at 200.
56. See William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal APA: Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, Judicial Remedies for Agency Inaction, and the Questionable Value of
Amending the APA, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 979, 1001 (2004) ("For example, it might be
appropriate to amend the APA to mandate general procedures governing informal
adjudication, given the large numbers of such informal proceedings and their perhaps
unanticipated rise in importance since 1946."); see also Michael Asimow, The Spreading
Umbrella: Extending the APA 's Adjudication Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings
Required By Statute, 56 ADMrN. L. REV. 1041 (2004) (advocating adoption of procedural
requirements to govern non-ALJ adjudications, a particular subset of informal
adjudications); Reese, supra note 7, at 15-16 (proposing minimum procedural safeguards for
informal adjudications by amending § 555(e)).
57. Marshall J. Breger, The APA: An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 VA. L.
REv. 337, 359 (1986).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Arthur E. Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72
VA. L. REv. 297, 322 (1986) (noting that "many types of federal agency adjudications are
entirely ungoverned by the adjudication provisions of the [APA], although a few of the
adjudication provisions of that statute might properly be applicable to those excluded
adjudications," and suggesting that "perhaps some other provisions should be added to the
federal act to deal specifically with those adjudications"); Martin Shapiro, APA: Past,
Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REv. 447, 481 (1986) ("Informal adjudication is the third type of
adjudication, and the APA might be amended here to provide some modest procedural
rules.").
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do so." 60 These requirements would be "aspirational, more like a code of
best practices than a set of legally binding requirements.,, 61 These
provisions sparked a great deal of debate within the section, but did not
garner consensus support; accordingly, the current working version of the
Report has omitted these "best practice" provisions.62
Of course, separation of powers issues loom in the background of any
proposal to broaden APA review to encompass all informal adjudications.
At some point, one might question whether a particular review scheme
does harm to Article II's vesting and faithful execution clauses.63 In this
regard, one should note that the ABA Administrative Law Section's Draft
Report would not have permitted judicial review of an agency's
compliance with the notice, participation, and statement of reasons
requirements.64
Even granting the salience of these concerns, the adoption of an
analogue to § 553(c)'s provisions on informal rulemaking seems a
reasonable approach to the problem, provided that the new procedures only
apply to a limited subset of informal adjudications. Professor Verkuil has
identified "fairness, efficiency, and satisfaction" as the hallmarks of a
fundamentally fair administrative process.65 These values should shape the
procedures applicable to covered informal adjudications. Moreover, any
new APA provisions should probably establish a floor, or minimum, that
effectively would preempt procedural due process claims, rather than
attempt to set a ceiling.
66
60. MICHAEL ASIMOW, PRESCRIPTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS: ADJUDICATION, REVISED
DRAFT at 1, 5, 15 (Dec. 5, 2003) (document on file with author).
61. Id. at 15. But see Rubin, supra note 5, at 176-82 (proposing a requirement that
agencies develop and publicize a "goal and plan" requirement for the implementation of
various policies and programs, and arguing that "[t]he goal and plan requirement provides
an assurance of fairness in these situations by revealing action based upon such motivations
['personal antipathy, bias, politics, or unjustified retaliation'] as deviations from the stated
plan").
62. See WILLIAM FUNK, CHAIR, SECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT, AMENDMENTS TO THE ADJUDICATION
PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL APA (CIRCULATION DRAFT) 1-20 (June 2, 2004) (omitting all
proposals regarding the adoption of "best practices" to govern non-ALJ federal agency
informal adjudications) (document on file with author).
63. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 34-37 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the President, as Chief Executive, must have authority to oversee and direct operations of
the Executive Branch, and positing that citizen-attorney general provisions effectively
transfer "faithful execution" of laws from the President and executive branch to private
litigants and Article III courts); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3
("He shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.").
64. See Asimow, supra note 60, at 15 (noting that "[b]ecause compliance with these
recommendations would not be judicially reviewable, the requirements should be viewed as
aspirational").
65. Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 258, 279-80 (1978).
66. As Professor Bonfield has noted, "[a] scheme with several distinct classes of agency
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In informal adjudications that especially affect the interests of an
individual or group of individuals in a way that is not generalized, the APA
should provide judicially enforceable, minimal procedural rights that
safeguard ex ante fairness in the agency's decisional process. When
government action "resembles real adjudication, since it involves the
imposition of governmental authority on particular individuals, and thus
implicates issues of fair treatment that are typically absent from
rulemaking,, 67 the APA should afford some minimal procedural rights to
the potentially affected person or persons. To borrow the language of the
Supreme Court's standing doctrine, 68 a would-be participant in the
agency's decisional process should possess a concrete and particularized,
as opposed to a diffuse and widely-held, interest in the outcome of the
proceeding.69
Such a limitation would avoid the embarrassment of creating a right to
public participation when an EPA staffer decides to raise or lower the
office thermostat. Moreover, creating a more limited class of potential
process claimants in informal adjudications would underprotect the
participation rights of the public. To state the matter plainly, an APA
amendment that failed to preempt procedural due process claims would not
be sufficient; although one could draw a more limited universe of informal
adjudications,70 this approach would fail to provide a uniform basket of
adjudication is more efficient because it assures a better fit between the adjudicatory
procedures required and the importance of the matters at stake." Bonfield, supra note 59, at
324. Consequently, "[t]he overhead costs of the procedures will be proportionate to the
significance of the issues involved in a particular case." Id; see also Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (adopting a balancing test to determine whether an agency has
provided adequate process, including consideration of "the private interest that will be
affected by the official action," "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards," and "the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burden that additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail").
67. Rubin, supra note 5, at 178.
68. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992) (holding that
Article III requires a would-be plaintiff to establish a personal injury that is both concrete
and particularized).
69. This approach would track an ACUS "best practices" proposal that provided that"each agency which takes actions affecting substantial public or private interests, whether
after hearing or through informal action, should, as far as is feasible in the circumstances,
state the standards that will guide its determination in various types of agency action, either
through published decisions, general rules or policy statements other than rules."
Recommendation 71-3, 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-3 (1985); see also Breger, supra note 57, at 359-
60 (discussing proposals for "best practices" guidelines that would encourage minimum
procedural protections in informal adjudications).
70. See Asimow, supra note 60, at 12-13 (proposing new APA-based procedural rules
to govern informal adjudications for which a statute requires an evidentiary hearing, which
he designates "non-ALJ adjudications," and emphasizing that "[n]on-ALJ adjudications
must be carefully distinguished from the vast realm of true 'informal adjudication,' which
does not involve statutorily required evidentiary hearings"); see also Paul R. Verkuil,
Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1341, 1341-42
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procedural rights that would preempt ad hoc procedural due process
analysis.71
The requirement of an individual, concrete, and particularized interest
would ensure that administrative decisionmaking would not be strangled.
The kinds of interests that would trigger process requirements are not
difficult to imagine: covered informal adjudications would include, for
example, making "initial grants or denials of benefits (such as National
Science Foundation applications) or rights of access to government
facilities (for example, the park rangers who control access to national
parks). 7 2 Similar decisions that adjust individual rights also would trigger
the new APA process requirements.
Looking in the opposite direction, establishing a broader, generally
applicable set of procedures that would open up virtually all agency
decisionmaking to interested persons would probably create more problems
than it would solve. A broader, generalized right of participation in all
informal adjudications would be impractical, unnecessary, and unjustified
on cost-benefit grounds. It might also run up against the Supreme Court's
efforts to limit standing in the context of citizen suits to enforce purely
procedural rights.73
Although defining with precision the nature of the procedural rights that
should apply in covered informal adjudications lies beyond the scope of
this Article, it seems logical to start with notice, some sort of opportunity to
be heard, and an explanation of how the agency decided to resolve the
question. In addition, some sort of internal agency appeal might be
required.
For example, if a park ranger must decide between two applicants for a
camp site in a national park, the claimants should have some sort of
opportunity for an informal give and take with the ranger, an explanation of
how the ranger decides to award the camp site, and the ability to appeal an
adverse decision after the fact. 74  Although a camper's interest in a
(1992) (distinguishing between ALJ adjudications, non-ALJ adjudications involving formal
evidentiary hearings, and "the millions of decisions that are rendered by countless other
deciders who adjudicate public rights, opportunities, or obligations in other settings that are
non-confrontational and often not even face-to-face").
71. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 739 (1976) (describing and critiquing various federal agencies' approaches to
conducting informal adjudications).
72. Verkuil, supra note 70, at 1342 n.2.
73. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-78 (holding that core separation of powers
concerns limit Congress's power to create generalized citizen standing, whether by creating
procedural rights or by some other means, to challenge the Executive Branch's
implementation of the law).
74. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580-84 (1975) (requiring an opportunity for
notice and an informal hearing before imposition of suspension from public school for up to
ten days on the theory that "[riequiring that there be at least an informal give-and-take
between student and disciplinarian" before the imposition of a suspension will reduce the
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particular camp site might well be date and site specific, a repeat customer
could have an ongoing interest in the rules and policies that govern access
to such sites.
For example, suppose that the ranger flipped a coin, rather than applying
a rule of first in time, first in right. Or suppose the ranger favored a family
with children over a couple without them. The requirement of a statement
of reasons, coupled with a right to an internal post-decision review within
the agency, would permit an aggrieved citizen to seek review, clarification,
and possibly reform of the relevant policy. As noted earlier, the APA
already provides for review on the merits of such decisions (unless
expressly excluded from the APA's coverage).
The adoption of minimum procedural safeguards, even in the context of
something as picayune as a dispute over a camp site, would simply
facilitate such review and, perhaps, create an adjudicative system for
covered informal adjudications that reduces the number of persons who
feel ill-used by the government. As Professor Rubin has explained,
"general claims to administrative discretion can conceal actions based on
unfair motivations such as personal antipathy, bias, politics, or unjustified
retaliation. '75
Other examples might include applications for employment or grants,
license and benefits applications, and any other individualized adjudicative
decision. Undoubtedly, most agencies already meet the rather low
threshold suggested here; accordingly, the cost of compliance with such a
regime should not be terribly high.
The benefits of such an approach are reasonably clear. For many who
apply for benefits, the possibility of ex post review, whether under the APA
and Overton Park or under the Constitution, is more theoretical than real.
Many applicants will lack simple awareness of a right to an appeal of an
adverse decision; even those aware of the possibility of judicial review and
wishing to seek such review will have difficulty obtaining and paying for
legal counsel.76 In sum, ex post review will be useless to many average
citizens.
77
Moreover, the opportunity for notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the
risk of erroneous determinations because the school administrator's "discretion will be more
informed").
75. Rubin, supra note 5, at 178.
76. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) (holding that "[t]he
opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who
are to be heard," and requiring that administrative procedures be designed to facilitate their
effective use by the average citizen).
77. See IVANS & DuBOSE, supra note 27, at 94-95 (describing a low follow-up rate
(33%) when an agency requires program applicants ineligible for one children's health
insurance program to file a new application with a different office in order to enroll in a
different program for which they probably qualify).
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creation of a written decision and internal appeal would facilitate judicial
review. Although Overton Park and Camp v. Pitts both suggest that the
absence of a record need not preclude judicial review, as a practical matter
the absence of a contemporaneous paper record inhibits the ability of both
the reviewing court and the appellant to discern precisely why the agency
acted as it did.78 Many agencies provide notice, an opportunity for hearing,
a decision, and an internal appeal already; for those that do not, however,
an APA requirement to do so would enhance important voice values that
would, at a minimum, improve the perceived fairness of an adverse
decision.79
CONCLUSION
Although the APA does not directly address informal agency
adjudications, the Constitution itself imposes minimum requirements on the
conduct of all government action. The guarantees of due process and equal
protection, in particular, establish a baseline requirement of rational
government action. Just as §§ 554, 556, and 557 effectively pretermit most
constitutional claims involving procedural due process in formal
adjudications, the APA should provide some minimal procedural
safeguards in informal adjudications that significantly affect a
particularized individual interest.
The benefits of such an approach are clear. As Justice Thurgood
Marshall noted, "a requirement of procedural regularity at least renders
arbitrary action more difficult. ' '80  Moreover, "proper procedures will
surely eliminate some of the arbitrariness that results, not from malice, but
from innocent error."81 Establishing a guarantee of minimum process ex
ante in a limited class of informal adjudications would advance these
82values in an important and significant way.
78. Moreover, Overton Park itself discourages the adoption of procedures that generate
a paper record precisely because doing so facilitates judicial review. As Professor Rubin
has suggested, "[r]eliance on such agency procedures will attract judicial attention the way
honey attracts bears, and any agency that wants to avoid the added scrutiny attendant to an
informal adjudication would be well advised to use some other mechanism for obtaining the
public's views." Rubin, supra note 5, at 128. In this sense "[t]he procedural requirements
that Overton Park devised are therefore parasitic on the agency's fortuitous choice to
engage in trial-type procedure for collecting information." Id.
79. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 115-57 (1990) (arguing that people
accept adverse decisions more readily when they perceive such decisions to have been the
product of a fundamentally fair process).
80. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. See Tyler, supra note 79, at 62-68, 162-78 (noting and explaining the importance of
process values to the perceived fairness or justice of a government agency's action).
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